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GUEST COMMENT
SECURITIES LAW - "SPLIT-SALE" § 16(b) Liability of Beneficial Owners for Short-Swing Profits- Reliance Electric Company v. Emerson Electric Company, 92 S. Ct. 596 (1972).

P

URSUANT to an attempted takeover of Dodge Manufacturing Company ("Dodge"), Emerson Electric Company ("Emerson") acquired 13.2 percent of the outstanding common stock
of Dodge.' In a defensive move, Dodge negotiated a merger
with Reliance Electric Company ("Reliance"). A proxy fight
ensued and the shareholders of Dodge subsequently approved
the Dodge-Reliance merger. Realizing its bid for control would
now be fruitless, Emerson sold enough of its recently acquired
Dodge stock to bring its holdings down to 9.96 percent of the
total outstanding shares. Two weeks later, Emerson sold the
remaining Dodge stock in its possession to Reliance. Both sales
were consumated within 6 months of Emerson's initial purchase and each yielded a considerable profit.2 Reliance, as
corporate successor to Dodge, demanded from Emerson the total
profit on both sales relying on the provisions of section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 3 Emerson filed suit in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri requesting a declaratory judgment determining its liability to Reliance.
The district court held that Emerson must account to Reliance
1On May 22, 1967, Emerson made a tender offer for shares of Dodge common stock. Emerson, on June 16th, upon the expiration of the tender
offer, purchased all 152,282 shares tendered.
2 Emerson's tender offer price was $63.00 per share. The first block of
stock, 37,000 shares, was sold to investment brokers at a price of $68.00
per share; the remaining shares, 115,282, were sold to Reliance at a price
of $69.00 per share.
3 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78
p(b) (1970), provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner
["Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner
of more than 10 percentum of any class of equity security (other
than an exempted security) which is registered .... " 15 U.S.C. §
78 p(a) (1970)], director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of
less than six months ...

shall inure to and be recoverable by the

issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the
security sold for a period exceeding six months ....

This sub-

section shall not be construed to cover any transaction where
such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved,
or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within
the purpose of this subsection.
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for the profits realized on both sales. 4 Emerson appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The court of appeals
reversed that part of the district court's finding that would
have forced Emerson to pay over the profits on the second sale
of the 9.96 block of stock. 5 On appeal by Reliance, the Supreme
Court affirmed, 6 holding that the second sale was specifically
exempted from the operation of section 16(b) since Emerson
was not the beneficial owner of a 10 percent interest in Dodge
at the time the second sale was made.
I. SECTION

16 (b)

OF THE SECURrrIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF

1934

Section 16(b) provides, in part, that a corporation has a
right to recover the profits realized by a beneficial owner of
more than 10 percent of its stock resulting from a purchase
and sale of such stock within any 6 month period. 7 The section is limited, however, to exclude from coverage "any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both
_t the time of purchase and sale."
Most cases dealing with a question under section 16(b)
have reviewed the history and congressional motives behind
the section's enactment.9 Stated briefly, the section was designed to curb the abuses of insider trading by forcing those
persons who might have access to inside information to return
all profits realized from short-swing transactions. 10 Factors
such as motive, intent, and actual access to or use of inside
information were not to be considered when applying the
statute." Congress had enacted "a relatively arbitrary rule
capable of easy administration" imposing strict liability on
those transaction which fall within its terms. 1'2 The use of a
4 Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 306 F.

Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo.
1969).
5 Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970).
1970).
6 Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 92 S. Ct. 596 (1972).
7 15 U.S.C. § 78 p(b) (1970).
8 Id.
I)See, e.g., Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840
(2d Cir. 1959); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
lOThe section covers only those persons and transactions that meet
the statutory definitions. The section is not designed to be a catchall for all situations where abuse might be present. Adler v. Klawans,
267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
1 Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 961 (1965); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Volk v. Zlotloff, 285 F. Supp. 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
1.2Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970).

"SPLIT SALE" SECTION 16(b) LIABILITY

"crude rule of thumb ' 13 to determine liability prompted at least
one court to suggest that the section was Draconian in its application. 14 Despite this apparent quest for objectivity, some factual, if not subjective, analysis was necessary to determine
whether liability attached. Thus, courts have had to decide
whether an individual came within the definition of an "officer," 15 "director, ' 16 or "beneficial owner;"'1 7 or if an "equity
security' '1 8 was traded; or if a particular transaction was a
"sale"' 9 or "purchase;"'
or if a purchase and sale took place
"within a six-month period."' 2 1
In a more fundamental departure from the strict objective approach, courts have begun to inquire into particular
transactions to see if the possibility of abuse of inside information was present..2 2 This analysis is not utilized to replace the
traditional objective approach but rather to supplement it.23
For example, in Petteys v. Butler,24 objective measures would
have dictated that a conversion of preferred shares to common
be characterized as a "purchase" - and thus, a subsequent
sale of the common within 6 months would be subject to
section 16(b) provisions - but because of the absence of the possibility of abuse in this particular case the court found no liaHearings on H.R. 9323 Before the Senate Committee on Banking and
See also Bershad v.
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934).
McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696-97 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
992 (1971); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 166 (3d Cir.
1965).
14 Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1002 (1967); see Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
15 Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
16 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
17 Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). See also Newmark v. RKO General,
Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
18 Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967); Ellerin
v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959).
19 Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 992 (1971); Newmark, v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Western Auto Supply Co. v. GambleSkogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987
(1966).
20 Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 892 (1965); see Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert
denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
21 Varian Associates v. Booth, 224 F. Supp. 225 (D.C. Mass. 1963), aff'd 334
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965). See B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964).
22 See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 518-20 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
23 Id. at 519.
24 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
13
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bility. The court's rationale was that "if an examination of the
facts indicates that there is no possibility of abuse, there is
no need to apply a section 16 (b) label to the transaction. '25 This
method of reasoning does not mean that the insider's "intent"
will be scrutinized, nor will an examination be made for proof
of actual use of inside information. Rather, the transaction
will be looked at to see if the circumstances afforded an opportunity for speculative abuse.

II.

EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY V. RELIANCE

ELEcTIc COMPANY

The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, in
deciding that the profit from both sales was recoverable, placed
great weight on the fact that the two separate sales were "effected pursuant to a single predetermined plan of disposition
with the overall intent and purpose of avoiding Section 16(b)
liability ...."26 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals saw little
merit in predicating liability on intent in general and intent
to avoid liability in particular: "[I]ntent . . .to avoid loss of
realized profits by engaging in two independent sales not
legally tied to each other and made at different times to different buyers . . .does not result in treating the two sales as
one sale of the entire stock held, nor as one continuous transaction .... ,,27
Purposeful conduct to minimize liability under section 16(b) "is to some extent analogous to tax avoidance con2' 8
duct which is permissible.
The Supreme Court, with Justice Stewart speaking for the
4-3 majority, 9 affirmed the court of appeals' decision. 3 The
Court found simply that Emerson was in fact not a 10 percent
beneficial owner of Dodge's stock at the time of the second
sale and therefore could not be required to disgorge its profits
from that sale. The majority allowed that "where alternative constructions of the terms of § 16(b) are possible, those
terms are to be given the construction that best serves the
congressional purposes of curbing short swing speculation
25

Id. at 535. See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967). See also Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82

27

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172
F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Comment, 59 YALE
L.J. 510 (1950); Comment, 45 VA. L. REV. 124 (1959).
306 F. Supp. at 592.
434 F.2d at 926.

28

Id. at 925.

26

The court of appeals referred in footnote 19 to the case

of Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1934),

which dealt with tax

avoidance.
29 Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
30 92 S. Ct. 596 (1972).
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by corporate insiders." 31 However, "a construction of the term
'at the time of ... sale' that treats two sales as one upon proof
of a pre-existing intent by the seller is scarcely in harmony
with the congressional design of predicating liability upon an
objective measure of proof. '3 2 The court could not adopt a
construction that "flatly contradicts the words of the statute. '38

III.

EXEMPTION PROVISION OF §

16(b)

It is not entirely clear whether the framers of section 16(b)
forsaw such a "split-sale" and decided to exempt it under the
phrase "both at the time of purchase and sale" or whether they
simply did not anticipate such a transaction. It is clear, however, that neither the majority nor the dissenters could cull any
specific dialogue from the congressional hearings to conclusively
support their respective postions.
Justice Stewart suggested that the reasoning behind the
exemption was "that Congress regarded one with a long-term
investment of more than 10% as more likely to have access
to inside information than one who moves in and out of the
10% category. '34 Considering the arbitrariness of the statute 35
and its use as a "crude rule of thumb, '36 this may well have
been the congressional motive behind the inclusion of the specific exemption in question. It is indeed unfortunate, however,
that the majority opinion could not cite a more definite rationale for the exemption. The Securities and Exchange Commission, in an amicus brief, argued:
The exemption was intended to operate in situations where a
person purchases stock of a corporation, subsequently becomes

a more than 10 percent beneficial owner through circumstances
other than a voluntary stock purchase, and then sells his stock
within six months of the purchase. 37
Id. at 600.
32 Id.
33
Id. at 601.
34 Id. at 600. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959), suggested
another reason why 10 percent beneficial owners were treated differently than officers and directors:
[Olfficers and directors have more ready access to the intimate
business secrets of corporations and factors which can affect the
real and ultimately the market value of stock than does even
so large a stockholder as a "10% beneficial owner."
35 See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970). See also cases cited note 13 supra.
86 Note 12 supra.
37 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 13, Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 92 S. Ct. 596 (1972). The Commission suggested two ways
this might happen: first, by legal succession; second, by a reduction in
the total number of outstanding shares of a corporation, thereby increasing the percentage holdings of a shareowner. Id. at 30.
31
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In other words, if the transaction that brought about the 10
percent status was voluntarily consumated, all sales within six
months would be subject to section 16(b) liability. 38 The SEC
based this conclusion on the fact that of the three classes of
persons upon whom liability is imposed (officers, directors, and
10 percent beneficial owners) only 10 percent beneficial owners
can become such involuntarily. 39 That is why, in the SEC's view,
the exemption provision mentions only 10 percent holders and
not officers and directors. 40 Given the paucity of legislative
history on this point, the Court was probably reluctant to adopt
such a position without more convincing proof. It must be conceded that if Congress meant to make some sort of distinction
between ownership voluntarily and involuntarily achieved, they
certainly could have done so in a provision much clearer than
the one finally included in the section.
IV. THE DIssENT:

"SPLIT-SALE"

AND

"SALE"

In trying to characterize Emerson's two separate sales as
one "sale," Justice Douglas in his dissent argued that the
Court "should contrue the statute as allowing a rebuttable
presumption that any such series of dispositive transactions will
be deemed to be part of a single plan of disposition, and will
be treated as a single 'sale' for the purposes of § 16(b)." '41 Although Justice Douglas maintained that this method would not
require the courts to delve into the forbidden "intent" inquiry,
his construction begs the question. If intent is irrelevant under
section 16(b) what difference can it make that intent is presumed rather than proved? In effect Justice Douglas is saying
that the split-sale situation ought to be covered, and if necessary a strong judicial hand should be wielded in interpreting
the statute so as to achieve that result. This is judicial legisla-

Id. at 14.
39 Id. at 29-30.
40 Id. at 29.
41 92 S. Ct. at 607 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas
found fault with the district court's reasoning when he said: "Insofar as
the district court's approach appears to place the burden on the plaintiff
to demonstrate the existence of a 'plan of distribution,' it is justifiably
open to criticism." Id. at 606. It seems Douglas' answer to this dilemma
is to conveniently assume such a plan given the "split-sale" circumstances.
The textual footnote to Douglas' language regarding the construcstruction of a "rebuttable presumption" makes an analogy to a similar
proposed rebuttable presumption concerning the so-called "private
placement" and the "view to distribution" concept. 92 S. Ct. at 596 n.12.
Unfortunately, this analogy fails because the search for proof of whether
the purchasers had a "view to distribution" centers on the "intent"
of the individual - something neither required nor at issue in a § 16(b)
case. See cases cited note 11 supra.
38
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tion at its clearest and is properly rebuked by the majority
opinion.
The Securities and Exchange Commission also suggested a
42
construction of the word "sale" as including a series of sales.
Rather than fabricating a rebuttable presumption that a "plan
of distribution" exists given a series of sales (as Mr. Justice
Douglas would), the Commission relied on the broad interpretive power of the Court to "effectuate the policy of section
16(b). '43 The problem with this approach is that the majority
of the Court neither accepts nor plans to utilize this power a power, in fact, unrecognized by the present Court.
V. LIABILiTY OF "Ex-BENEFICIAL OWNERS"

Both the Securities and Exchange Commission 44 and Mr.
Justice Douglas 45 maintained that section 16(b) liability should
be extended to ex-beneficial owners on the same rationale that
led the Court to hold ex-directors liable in Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corp.,46 viz., information obtained while occupying a
favorable position with a corporation does not lose its utility
simply because that relationship is terminated. Although this
argument has considerable facial appeal, it will not withstand
close scrutiny.
As Mr. Justice Stewart points out, the "SEC's own rules
undercut such an interpretion. '' 47 The Commission, pursuant to
the powers granted in the statute, 48 promulgated rule 16a-10
that exempts from 16(b) liability any transaction that does not
fall within the reporting requirements of section 16(a) .4" Rule
16(a) requires that officers, directors, and beneficial owners
report at the end of each month any changes in their stock
holdings during the month. The Commission's original interpretation of that rule, Form 4, determined that such a report was
necessary only if the status of officer, director, or 10 percent
beneficial owner was maintained during the month.--- This ad42
43

Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 13.
Id. at 34.

44 Id.
45

at 26.

92 S. Ct. at 609 (dissenting opinion).

The
46406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
specific holding of the Feder case stated that § 16 (b) applies to a sale of
stock by a former director if the stock was purchased by him during
the time he was a director and the sale was made within 6 months
after purchase - seemingly regardless of when resignation took place.
Id. at 269.
47 92 S. Ct. at 601.
48 15 U.S.C. § 78 p(b) (1970) (last sentence).
49 SEC Rule 16 a-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.
50 Form 4, SEC Release No. 6487 (March 9, 1961).
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clearly

Mr. Justice Douglas was quick to respond that the Feder
case found that "Rule 16a-10 was invalid, insofar as it operated
through Form 4 to exempt transactions by ex-directors
from liability under § 16(b)."'51 He reasoned that the Feder
analysis would be equally applicable to deny this exemption to
ex-10 percent owners. 52 What Justice Douglas fails to acknowledge is that Feder clearly excluded the analogy to 10 percent
holders: "[T]he act expressly sets forth that the liability of a
10% shareholder to surrender his short-swing profits is conditional upon his being such both at the time of purchase and at
the time of sale, but there is no such limitation in the case of
officers and directors. '53 It is difficult to put much faith in an
argument based on a source that expressly denies the reasoning
of the argument.
VI. FUTURE OF SECTION

16 (b)

Doubtless many critics of Reliance will rise to side with
Justice Douglas in saying that this decision "is a mutilation of the Act." 54 But it must be remembered that this case,
as it now stands, does not entirely guarantee that similar treatment will be afforded all future "split-sales" cases. This lack
of certainty is a product of the extent to which the legal
theories involved in section 16(b) cases tend to center on the
particular facts before the court. For example, the district
court's Reliance opinion, in language quoted by the Supreme
Court, characterized Emerson's two sales as "not legally tied
to each other."55 Although neither court advanced any guidelines on what sales "legally tied to each other" might mean or
how such a transaction might be proven, 6 the way is clearly
open for the Court to find in future cases that the particular
sales under consideration had the legal connection not present
in Reliance and should be treated as a single sale.
The Court might also employ the theory announced in
Petteys v. Butler5 7 to exempt the profits of all sales in a
51 92 S. Ct. at 608 (dissenting opinion).
52 Id.
at 609.
53 406 F.2d at 267 (citations omitted).
54 92 S. Ct. at 602 (dissenting opinion).
55 306 F. Supp. at 591-92. The district court borrowed this phrase from an
intra-company memo prepared by Emerson's corporate counsel which
explicitly set out the liability avoidance motive for the split-sale.
56 This vagueness has been roundly attacked. See Note, 5 GA. L. REV. 584
(1970).
57 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
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Reliance-type series from corporate recovery under section
16(b). In Petteys, a 16 (b) insider had converted preferred stock
into common following a call for redemption of the preferred.
Had the preferred stock not been converted, the insider would
have suffered a considerable loss on the redemption. The question before the court was whether such a conversion constituted
a "purchase" of the common stock for the purposes of section
16(b). While freely admitting that under traditional standards
the transaction would be classified as a "purchase," the court
refused to impose liability because in the particular circumstances presented, the opportunity for abuse was not present.
In Reliance, Emerson was left holding a substantial block
of Dodge stock after its attempted takeover failed. It was obviously in a most unfavorable position. It had to sell and risk
16(b) liability or hold the stock and be forced to exchange it
for shares in the new Dodge-Reliance corporation. This latter
course of action might have also incurred 16(b) liability. 58
The Petteys principle might easily have been applied to exempt
all sales necessary for Emerson to extricate itself from this
predicament. The transaction at issue in Petteys was of a type
capable of abuse-a conversion from preferred to common
shares.5 9 Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission
and Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that the instant transaction
was also of the type that could, under some circumstances, be
utilized for insider speculation. The Court in this case never
had to reach the next step in the Petteys approach, i.e., an
examination to determine whether no abuse was possible under
There is an intimation in the opinion to that effect. The majority cited
Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 400
U.S. 854 (1970), as standing for the proposition that an exchange of stock
pursuant to a merger agreement was a "sale" under § 16 (b). 92 S. Ct.
596, 598. They did not, however, say that Newmark would control the
instant case had the need arisen to decide the issue. Newmark has been
interpreted as allowing an inquiry into whether opportunity for abuse
is present. Katz, Short-Swing Liability, 2 REV. OF SECURITIEs REGULATION
916 (1969); See note 60 infra. It would appear that Katz's interpretation
of Newmark is correct in light of Abrams v. Occidental Pet. Corp.,
450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub nom Kern County Land Co.
v. Occidental Pet. Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1498 (1972). There the court found
that Newmark did not establish an inflexible rule that forced exchanges
of shares would always be looked upon as "sales" for the purposes of
establishing § 16(b) liability. Rather the Abrams court distinguished
Newmark on the basis that knowledge of impending defensive mergers
and ability to control the same would be highly determinative - factors
that were present in Newmark and not present in Abrams. Had the
Court in the present case made a similar search, perhaps these factors
would also have been found absent.
Interestingly, based on the Securities and Exchange Commission's
own "voluntary-involuntary" dichotomy it seems that if Emerson had
held onto their Dodge shares, and been forced (i.e. involuntarily) to
exchange them for new shares in the Dodge-Reliance Corporation, the
transaction would be exempt from § 16(b) liability. Brief for SEC as
Amicus Curiae n.14.
59 See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
58
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the circumstances of this particular case. One wonders if the
Court might not have done just that were it not for the presence
of a convenient exception which served to minimize the severity
of section 16(b) as it applies to 10 percent beneficial owners.
Certainly, the possibility of abuse in Reliance was not appreciably greater than in Petteys.
Whether the aspect of "possibility of abuse" will be flexed
to deal with different fact situations, has yet to be seen. There
can be no doubt, however, that the Court will have to face
corporate merger situations where it would be unfair to blindly
apply 16(b) sanctions to innocent transactions. 0
CONCLUSION

The Wall Street Journal hailed this decision as an indication
that the Court was taking a turn to the "Right."6 But this case
is beholden to no pat rules of construction. The transaction
at issue seems to comfortably attach itself to the specific exemptive language of the statute. The unanswerable question that
remains is whether Congress actually intended to exempt splitsale situations or simply left a loophole in the statute. 62 Precisely because it is not clear from the legislative history which
of the above is correct, it appears that this decision reached
the preferable result. If Congress meant to exempt this transaction, the instant case did just that. If not, Congress has
ample opportunity to plug the loophole recognized in Reliance.

60 For example:

Where the management of the target company indicates a defensive merger with a third company to thwart a tender offer,
the tender offerer typically is neither privy to the defensive
merger nor apprised of plans for its consumation. Having failed
in a bid to gain control through the tender offer, but having
obtained enough stock to become a statutory insider, the offeror
is locked into securities if a hostile issuer. It may be obliged to
dispose of such securities pursuant to a corporate reorganization
over which it has no control and with respect to which it
obviously has no inside information. It is fair to say that the
imposition of section 16 (b) liability in this contest would involve
an unjustifiable and probably unintended hardship. Katz,
Short-Swing Liability, 2 REV. OF SECURITIES REGULATION 916

(1969).

The headline was:
"Supreme Court Opens Loophole in Trading by Insiders; Economic Turn
to Right Seen."
(32
Interestingly enough, as early as 1934 it was pointed out that this type
of "split-sale" transaction would appear to avoid liability under § 16(b):
"[T]he intention of the language was to exclude the second sale in a
case where 10% is purchased, 5% sold within three months, and the
remaining 5% a month later." Seligman, Problems Under the Securities
Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1934). See also, 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs
REGULATION 1060 (2d. ed. 1961) where a similar course of action was
recommended.
61 Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
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As Justice Stewart correctly pointed out,6

3

the Supreme Court

is not the proper forum for remedial work on the statute.
Charles C. Turner*

63 92 S. Ct. at 600.
*
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